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Abstract 
In this paper, the influence of the construction of children as civilians over the processes of 
securitization in the US intervention in Somalia is examined.  This is done through an 
analysis of the US print news media coverage of that event.  The study employs two key 
theoretical frameworks:  the first is the social understanding of civilianhood; and the second is 
the Copenhagen School’s theory of securitization.  The work concludes that a failure to 
unpack the value of referent objects of security diminishes the insights that securitization 
theory can offer.  The grammar of securitizing moves cannot be fully comprehended in 
instances of militarized humanitarian interventions, in particular, without this kind of 
analysis.  Children as suffering civilians draw considerable attention from the world’s media 
and thus an investigation of their role in securitization can be highly informative.  
 
Introduction 
The importance of children to the world of international relations has grown markedly in the 
last three decades.  Their heightened salience is amply demonstrated by the near universal 
adoption of the Convention of the Rights of the Child and the advocacy work from which it 
sprang.  In the world of practice, an increasing number of development and post-conflict 
reconstruction programmes make children their chief concern.  The world’s media expose us 
to countless images of suffering children which remain the leitmotif of emergency relief fund-
raising campaigns.
1
  Unconventionally fought civil wars in which civilians are 
disproportionately affected provide a prodigious amount of such imagery.  However, the 
current media coverage of Syria proves that conventional weaponry when targeted at civilians 
can produce equally shocking representations of children’s suffering. 
 
Despite the added attention children have attracted, scholarship on children and security is 
still scant.  A small cohort of scholars engage with the security issues children present but 
their collective output is small and often appears on the fringes.  Consequently there is 
insufficient theorization of children’s role’s in security.  This paper, as part of this special 
issue, seeks to partially address that deficiency.  In it, the influence of the construction of 
children as civilians over the processes of securitization is examined.  This is achieved 
through an analysis of the US print news media coverage of the US humanitarian intervention 
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in Somalia in the early 1990s.  The study employs two key theoretical frameworks:  the first 
is the social understanding of civilianhood; and the second is the Copenhagen School’s theory 
of securitization.  The work concludes that a failure to unpack the value of referent objects of 
security diminishes the insights that securitization theory can offer.  The grammar of 
securitizing moves cannot be fully comprehended in instances of militarized humanitarian 
interventions, in particular, without this kind of analysis.  Children as suffering civilians draw 
considerable attention from the world’s media and thus an investigation of their role in 
securitization has something to teach us. 
 
The paper begins with a brief overview of the US intervention in Somalia, explaining how it 
constituted an extraordinary measure for the US at the time and how, in addition, it is atypical 
of traditional subject matter for securitization theorists.  A first reading of the public discourse 
on Somalia carried in several dozen US newspapers follows.  Insights from Kinsella’s 
genealogy of the social construction of civilianhood provide a useful starting point for a 
second reading of the newspaper texts.  The second reading sketches the role played by 
constructions of child civilians in the securitization and desecuritization of the Somali war.  
Concluding comments highlight shortcomings in securitization theory that the analysis 
reveals. 
 
The Somali Civil War 
The civil war that erupted in Somalia in 1991 quickly gave rise to a humanitarian disaster on 
a monumental scale.  Exacerbated by drought, famine engulfed large swathes of the country.  
Internal as well as international displacements of refugees were estimated at two million.  “By 
1992, almost 4.5 million people, more than half the total number in the country, were 
threatened with starvation, severe malnutrition and related diseases,” the UN reported.
2
  It 
was said on Capitol Hill that one quarter of the population under five years of age had 
perished by mid year.
3
  Intense media coverage and mobilisation of global civil society 
groups such as the International Red Cross and Médecins Sans Frontières were followed by 
mobilisation at governmental level.  With support from over thirty nations, the UN embarked 
on a humanitarian relief mission (UNOSOM I) succeeded by militarised humanitarian 
intervention of a decidedly muscular kind (UNITAF, UNOSOM II) intended to create peace 
and stability and rebuild the Somali state and economy.  UNITAF was sanctioned by the UN 
Security Council under a chapter VII mandate (resolution 794) but the multinational force 
came under US command as the supplier of 80 percent of troops, twenty five thousand in 
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number.  UNITAF was charged with the task of facilitating aid delivery using “all necessary 
means.”  
 
The humanitarian intervention took on particular significance in US public discourse in part 
because the country had long been a space in which superpower rivalry had played out.  
Otherwise the country was of little strategic importance.
4
  President Siad Barre had utilised 
this rivalry to extract aid and thus maintain a 21-year long period of office in which a large 
degree of coercion was exercised, garnering a reputation for excessive force for his clan.  
Their “terror tactics included the indiscriminate slaughter of civilians, mutilating opponents’ 
faces and burning their genitals with acid,” it was reported.
5
  On his demise, his followers laid 
“a deadly web of more than 100,000 mines” in gardens, refugee camps and roadsides.
6
  His 
eventual fall from power in the absence of superpower support contributed to political 
destabilisation and the collapse of the Somali state shortly afterwards.  The power vacuum 
left behind was colonised by a cohort of ‘warlords.’  Despite US confidence that the 
simplicity of Somali materiel and warfighting methods would guarantee their success, 
Somalia became the setting of an ignominious encounter with a local warlord and his cohort.
7
  
The loss of life was pivotal to the superpower’s effective withdrawal subsequently.  
Notwithstanding its success in averting continued famine, the failure of the multilateral 
mission to extract Somalia from the grips of warlordism and conflict undermined the UN’s 
reputation and put into question the feasibility of robust peacekeeping operations.
8
  
Furthermore, the humiliating defeat of US forces was to have negative repercussions for the 
likelihood of the superpower participating directly in similar ventures again.
9
  The loss of life 
among Pakistani and US peacekeepers exposed the folly of assumptions prevalent at the time 
of the pacific nature of the post-cold war global order.
10
  
 
The US intervention in Somalia constitutes an example of securitization, albeit an unusual 
one. For the Copenhagen School, securitization occurs when an issue becomes linked to 
security and is promoted beyond the realm of normal politics through the ‘speech acts’ made 
by significant ‘securitizing’ actors.  In the zone of exceptional politics where the issue is 
debated, there is a true openness to possibilities, a feature normal politics does not display to 
the same extent.  Securitization theorists are mostly occupied with issues that occur within or 
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impact on the state.  The referent objects of the security issues they examine involve 
existential level threats to, for example, the citizenry, military forces or environment of the 
state.  Militarized humanitarian interventions deviate from this form because the referent 
object of security is a foreign population beyond the boundaries of the state.  Even if 
existential threat to large numbers of foreigners outside the state can be shown, the issue does 
not normally give rise to securitization.  Existential threat to the state or its constituent parts 
(citizenry, political structures, way of life, etc.) as a consequence of this must be evident.  
Although no US strategic interests were threatened by war in Somalia, arguably, President 
George HW Bush’s ideas for a new world order and the US place within it were at stake if the 
country did not act.  One could also argue that US self identity as guardian of the new world 
order was at risk.  Apart from existential threat, there were other respects in which Somalia 
constituted a securitization for the US, in the way in which it exceeded normal politics, for 
example.  There was sufficient reluctance in Washington to involvement which considerable 
debate between Bush, his National Security Council, the Pentagon and others was needed to 
overcome. The death of 241 Marines in Beirut in 1983 and a new military doctrine advocating 
overwhelming (and therefore expensive) force deployment in such situations were only some 
of the problems to be resolved if intervention were to go ahead.   
 
Of course, much has been made of the influence of humanitarian organizations and the media 
on the outcome of that debate although this remains contested.  Reports of overwhelming 
suffering were said to have helped Bush decide on intervention and were important in 
drumming up pressure from the American public, from the UN and abroad.  Of all lives to be 
saved, the US and its public were entreated to come to the aid of a specific group – children – 
not simply a monolithic block of civilians.  Official and grass roots humanitarian 
organizations mirrored the media’s elevation of children’s plight.
11
  Assistant Administrator 
for the US Agency for International Development (USAID) told the House Select Committee 
on Hunger that “the real tragedy was that of the starving Somali children.”
12
   Politicians were 
alive to the publicity surrounding children’s plight and apparently motivated by it.  Lawrence 
Eagleburger, acting US Secretary of State at the time, has said that in addition to substantial 
pressures from Congress, the US President, George Bush, was driven to act by “pictures of 
those starving kids.”
13
  Assuming that there is at least some truth to this claim, then it is 
important to understand the prominence of constructions of the suffering of child civilians in 
the discourse and how these structured the field of meaning.  This is the matter to which the 
paper now turns. 
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 US public discourse: A first reading 
The American-led intervention guaranteed that the western media would be particularly 
heavily involved in covering the crisis and in maintaining Somalia at the top of the media 
agenda.
14
  The result is a large stock of articles in the print news media, numbering several 
thousand.  For the discourse analysis that follows, a random sample of over four hundred was 
scrutinized.  From this number, representative quotes were extracted to illustrate patterns of 
representation.  Four sets of securitizing actors figured in this discourse: foreign news 
journalists who authored it and the humanitarians, politicians, and diplomats (international 
and domestic) they drew on for information and quotes.  As the intention here is to show how 
child civilians figured in the process of securitization, particular emphasis has been placed on 
them in this reading.  
 
Kinsella’s investigation of the social construction of civilianhood over time stresses gender, 
innocence and vulnerability.  These will be discussed briefly later.  For now it is sufficient to 
note that the latter two signifiers are strongly associated with children in the western social 
imaginary, in addition to age.  Children are also linked to particular spaces and activities: 
home or school, play rather than labour.  Oftentimes, they are coupled with the activities of 
the family unit such as socialization, reproduction and care and they are frequently embedded 
in representations of family structure, as daughters and sons, siblings and grandchildren etc.  
Ideologies exist in which children are perceived as inherently good or evil, or as individuals 
in the process of becoming, i.e. developing.  In the western social imaginary, childhood is 
closely related to nature and to the body.  These various aspects of childhood are listed here 
not to define it but to provide markers that orient a first reading of the news media texts.
15
  In 
the sections that follow they are highlighted where they have been found to be important 
signifiers in the discourse as a whole.  This first reading of the texts is broken into a number 
of themes that dominated the texts.  They are: vulnerability; women and children; family, 
culture and masculinity; trauma; irrationality, backwardness and passivity; the rescuers and 
the rescued.  
 
Vulnerability 
Although highly impersonalized in form, the use of statistics in the texts conveyed the acute 
vulnerability of the population as the civil war in Somalia got under way.  Much of the early 
reportage, in particular, focused on the sheer numbers of those suffering war-related injuries, 
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famine or displacement and the rate at which they were dying, conjuring up a profound sense 
of urgency.  USA Today, for example, relayed the UN secretary-general’s startling assertion 
that 100 thousand had already died after a year of war, that 2.5 million had been displaced 
and a third of the population (1.5-2 million) would “die within the next six months if 
emergency food supplies do not reach that country soon.”
16
  The overwhelming nature of the 
problems facing the refugees were apparent in descriptions of, for example, how they 
“flooded over the border,” creating massive “tent cities” where they landed and forming 
throngs at feeding centres.
17
  
 
From the texts, it was clear that the population’s vulnerability was thought to stem from 
sources external to the subject such as the state and armed groups, as well as sources internal 
to the individual such as human biology.  The core functions of the public sphere, like the 
monopoly on the use of force, were lost as the state collapsed.  A multiplicity of state 
institutions crumbled.  The “national currency [had] become worthless and only food [had] 
any monetary value,” Associated Press stated.
18
  Similar observations were made by others:  
“There is no government.  No civil service.  No commerce.  No food.”
19
  Social provision, 
such as medical care, was negligible in its Western sense. In the absence of the rule of law, 
guns became the chief form of authority, according to Reuters.
20
  The greatest peril appeared 
to come from the warring factions themselves.   The brutality of clan warlords and their gangs 
of supporters prompted Africa Watch to remark that Mogadishu had become “a special place 
in the annals of human cruelty.”
21
   
 
The physical conditions imposed on populations by the war were further external 
determinants of vulnerability, exacerbating the everyday challenges of survival in what was 
presented as an unforgiving climate.  Somalia was said to be “one of the unhealthiest places 
on Earth, where a scratch can become a festering wound in days.”
22
  There was little respite 
offered by a healthcare system crippled by war.  One account of the squalid conditions of one 
Somali hospital described “the stench of human decay” that greeted the reporter’s arrival.
23
   
 
Women and children 
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The conditions took their toll on women and children more than men, according to most 
depictions.  The shelter that starving women could find in the “punishing heat” might be no 
more than makeshift huts made from branches and cardboard.
24
  Women’s isolation from men 
worsened their predicament.  “The women were the ones who were suffering,” the Dallas 
Morning News insisted,  “The men were off fighting, so only the women were occupied with 
taking care of the children, the old people, even the injured men.”
25
  But women were also 
victims of a patriarchal culture in which stoning of women prostitutes still occurred, a 
punishment the journalist found “incongruous for the end of the 20
th
 century.”
26
  The physical 
dimensions to their vulnerability were frequently rehearsed.  The story of several women who 
were injured on barbed wire barricades while food rioting erupted offers a prime example.
27
 
 
Young children fared little better by Somali culture.  Girls were denied education in the 
Koranic system of schooling, for example.
28
  Many starving children were reduced to sucking 
on bones, not for nourishment but for the comfort derived from mimicking eating, a UN 
worker explained.
29
  During war, it was clear that children were worst affected.  Time and 
again, newspapers reminded readers of their predicament and linked it to warlord and clan 
behaviour.  “I hate them,” one child answered when asked about local combatants, their clan 
violence being the chief obstacle to his development for the press.
30
  A quarter of all under 
fives had perished before US humanitarian intervention had begun and two hundred or more 
children were dying daily in the capital.
31
  Some were even killed by soldiers for bags of 
grain.
32
  The state of the war-torn country was closely linked to the plight of its children.  A 
French minister, describing his impressions on a visit there was reported to say, “I found 
death, the death of a country and above all of children lying in the streets.”
33
 
 
There was no segment of society more symbolic of vulnerability than the orphan population.  
Physical weakness due to youth and hunger and a lack of protection by family, clan or the 
public sphere rendered them the supreme victims of war.   
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Robbed of their fathers by war and their mothers by famine and disease, 
thousands of Somali children have been left orphaned, struggling to survive on 
their own in the chaos of a country in which their villages have been destroyed, 
their extended families have disappeared and no government structure exists to 
care for them.
34
 
 
Constructed as targets of attack on account of the food they received from international 
agencies, many orphans were relocated to a leper colony that warlords’ were too fearful to 
approach.
35
  For reporters, the story illustrated the degeneration of the social order in Somalia 
such that its weakest members could be the targets of violence.  Further discussion about 
Somalis’ resistance to the adoption of orphans by foreigners confirmed the suspicion that 
Somali society did not hold the best interests of children at heart:  “when outsiders have 
offered to adopt orphans and provide homes for them in the United States or Europe, Muslim 
tradition and Somali culture have combined to block their efforts.”
36
 
 
Family, culture and masculinity 
The family and clan was considered the primary vector of a pastoral tradition in Somalia and 
the “bedrock of identity.”  Yet, they also promoted the “continual atomization of the society” 
and a failure to recognise the public good.
37
  A blindness to the public good allowed Somali 
clans and sub-clans to continue to fight unmoved by the dire need in their midst and intent to 
actively add to the tragedy, it was argued, by attacking aid shipments for example.
38
  The clan 
thus promoted values antithetical to community spirit or peace.  It entrenched an aggressive, 
militarism in an individualistic people, the New York Times maintained.
39
  Even in high 
political office, the same sentiments had traction.  Former US ambassador to Kenya, Smith 
Hempstone, described Somalis in a cable to the president as “natural-born guerrillas... 
treacherous.  The Somali is a killer.  The Somali is as tough as his country, and just as 
unforgiving.”
 40
   
 
In the media narrative of the conflict, it was Somali men and adolescent boys who manifested 
this aggressive national character.  In the capital, there were said to be “thousands of armed, 
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hungry and ill-disciplined men roaming the streets.”
41
  Their lack of self control was often 
exacerbated by drugs.  Their aggression was untrammeled and  “untrained, frenzied young 
men” created such anarchy that one reporter dubbed the conflict a “Western.”
42
  There was 
such a ready availability of small arms that a US aid official alleged that a “very high 
percentage of males above puberty are carrying automatic weapons.”  The levels of violence 
young Somali males dished out was of great concern and the psychological toll this took on 
the perpetrators themselves in addition to their victims.  It seemed from accounts that 
thousands of children used as soldiers in the war had lost their moral code.  Trauma was the 
legacy of war for these boys, some as young as 10 or 12 who thereafter were “haunted by 
dreams of death.”
43
   
 
Trauma 
The media rendered the population deeply and in some cases irrevocably affected by 
exposure to war and famine. “People were being killed in front of us...  Women were being 
raped in front of us,” one Somali recalled.
44
  Large numbers of the population had watched as 
their family members, sometimes all of them, died from famine.
 45
  Such stories cast into 
doubt the prospect of Somalia’s recovery.  “The survivors of great famines are broken for all 
their lives,” the Seattle Times claimed, “their children inherit the frailty of their parents.  They 
are a weight that retards the recovery of the people as a whole.”
46
  
 
The psychological damage done during the war was used by some to account for the 
behaviour of some women and children during and after the infamous ‘Battle of Mogadishu’ 
in which several US peacekeepers died.  The women and children had joined the gunmen in 
scuppering a US operation and had participated in the public desecration of the bodies of the 
peacekeepers and a translator who died during the ensuring combat.
47
  The revulsion felt by 
the American public was clearly reflected in newspapers’ language.  The more restrained of 
them described the women and children as “jubilant” as they flaunted a dead man’s teeth in 
their hands to foreign journalists.
48
  To make sense of these acts as the public uproar in the US 
grew USA Today consulted a political psychologist who explained the events as the result of 
the regular “demonization and dehumanization of the enemy” in war.  Another accounted for 
the triumphalist display as retribution from a nation who had seen many of their own killed by 
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US weapons.
49
  The implication of the texts was clear: Somalia’s civilians had been corrupted 
by their experiences of war and now constituted a threat to US peacekeepers. 
 
Irrationality, backwardness and passivity 
Somalis were regularly depicted as uneducated, backward and child-like.  “Too many youths 
[...] can shoot a gun but don’t know how to read,” a Unicef worker lamented.
50
  The violence 
they engaged in was described as feuding and their warfare and materiel as outdated.
51
  World 
politics was thought to lie beyond their grasp.
 52
  They were frequently pictured high on khat 
that even adolescent boys chewed.
53
  Somali behaviour was regularly constructed as irrational 
and self-defeating.
54
  They were, in the words of one commentator, “incapable of giving 
themselves stable and competent government, even when left alone to try.”
55
  Their response 
to the humanitarianism shown towards them was baffling.  “[I]t must be asked,” one 
Canadian journalist mused, “why people who have been saved from starvation should now be 
consumed by such savage hatred of their erstwhile benefactors.”
56
   
 
However, it was the bodies of the starving that did most to convey irrationality.  The majority 
of Somali civilians were represented as little more than frail bodies, as surfaces on which the 
narratives of death and suffering could be written.  A typical account would highlight the state 
of emaciation of limbs, the slowness of movement and the dullness of the responses of the 
starving.
57
  Almost invariably, the agency of starving civilians was omitted from the texts and 
indeed seemed almost impossible given their physical state.  The picture drawn of a four-year 
old in soiled clothing “blink[ing] dully, giving scant attention to the sore on his arms” while 
an IRC nurse described his imminent death is one such passivating account.
58
  Readers were 
not spared descriptions of emaciation and the blood, urine, pus and diarrhea that accompanied 
many Somalis’ last moments.  One American nurse compared the scene of starvation to “a 
horror movie in which skeletons emerge from their graves to terrorize the living.”
59
   
 
The rescuers and the rescued 
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Media accounts regularly depicted the endeavours of the peacekeepers and humanitarian aid 
workers.  They focused on the enormity of the task they faced and the expertise and 
capabilities they employed in battling it.  The American media placed great value on the 
contribution of US forces, in particular.  For instance, one newspaper reported that eleven US 
planes could transport twice as much food into Somalia as the combined relief agencies had 
managed in eight months.
60
  With UNITAF, the US could protect relief convoys and ensure 
aid reached those who needed it rather than the strongest clans.
61
  It could dispense with the 
hiring of local gunmen to guard aid.
62
  Its military (being the major contributor of forces) 
could use its strength to put an end to the starving of over a million people and facilitate 
recovery.  It could act, in effect, like a “cavalry.”
63
  The much-needed care international teams 
could give could begin with the security that US peacekeepers brought to the country.  
Accordingly, “[a]id workers could do their job again and they slowly nurse Somalia back 
from its deathbed.”
64
   
 
With the success of the mission in its early months, there was reason for Americans to 
express pride. “[The peacekeepers] were acting in the best spirit of America,” President 
Clinton commented.
65
  The generosity of the American public was a source of satisfaction:  
“The idea that kids are dying because no one can spare a handful of grain is not acceptable to 
most Americans.”
66
  The US had been able to wield its power to good ends.  Aid workers 
faced daunting challenges. “We’re now feeding two or three times the number of children that 
our feeding centres were designed for,” an SCF field director explained.  An American was 
described running a hospital of 20 beds as the sole hospital service for two million people in 
another report.
67
  The physical danger the aid staff worked under was considerable, and 
mortal at times. 
 
There was also a psychological risk attached to the humanitarian mission.  Aid workers 
recalled the scenes of death they had encountered that continued to haunt them.
68
  The 
psychological ill effects of exposure to war and famine were even felt by US troops.  They 
too were distressed by the sight of children starving and of rape and “confused” by Somalis 
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who were hostile to them, throwing stones, spitting or even shooting at them.
69
  However, this 
had been expected, however:  “Officials here say that they are more concerned about the 
psychological impact of human suffering on their soldiers than they are about the threats of 
Somali street gangs or illness.”
70
 
 
The Somali crisis provoked a profound emotional response from the family members of aid 
workers and peacekeepers ‘back home.’  Families of US peacekeepers were interviewed in 
the wake of the Battle of Mogadishu and told journalists of their worry and sleeplessness in 
the days preceding it as the situation in Somalia steadily worsened.  Upon witnessing the 
“televised horror” of the battle itself, a soldier’s mother recalled, “I went to pieces...  
Devastated, I wanted to die myself.
71
  Revulsion was reflected across the spectrum of 
newspapers in the aftermath of the battle.  A journalist opined “The blood of our courageous 
troops is too precious to spill into this quagmire.”.
72
  The conviction was even more visible in 
the US press coverage that followed the battle.  “Our brave troops’ blood means too much to 
all of us to squander on a war that rightly isn’t ours to wage.  Let’s bring them home.”
73
  A 
sense of US community was invoked by the battle as it had been by the intervention’s 
instigation. 
 
Child civilians: a second reading 
From the sketch of the discourse presented above, three types of subject emerge: civilians, 
combatants and humanitarians (peacekeepers and aid workers).  As this paper claims that the 
construction of child civilians helped to shape securitization, it is appropriate to turn now to 
the concept of civilianhood. Legally, civilianhood equates prima facie with non-combatant 
status and invokes the principle of non-combatant immunity.
74
  However, Kinsella’s 
genealogy posits a range of powerful social meanings to the term that may be separated here 
from its weighty legal connotations for the purposes of this analysis.  According to Kinsella, 
the concept of the civilian is related to, inter alia, age, corporeality and family but gender 
above all.  Kinsella’s reading argues that putatively ‘natural’ female characteristics have long 
been the basis for distinguishing the category of civilian from combatant.  Innocence and a 
need for protection are especially critical to civilianhood.  Indeed, one could say that these 
two ‘feminine’ characteristics are the sources of value for civilianhood, the referent objects of 
security.  Historically, effort has been invested in reforming women into individuals with 
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fittingly feminine subjectivities when they have conducted themselves in ways that apparently 
flout their gender.
75
  In contrast, women civilians who performed the roles of men lost their 
civilian status and were effectively treated as men.
76
  In short, the maintenance of the 
boundaries to conceptualizations of women and civilians required the disciplining of deviant 
individuals by rehabilitation or reclassification to retain their gendered logic. 
 
For Kinsella, the primary distinction between the civilian and combatant is gender, all other 
meanings of civilianhood are epiphenomenal.  A corollary of the centrality she awards to 
gender is that other categories of civilians – children, the elderly, the sick and other non-
combatants – must also display typically gendered attributes to qualify as civilians.  It is 
argued here that gender does not exhaust the meaning of civilian.  Gender may provide the 
main logic as the dominant signifier, nonetheless, other key signifiers and articulations in the 
discourse are noteworthy and crucial to the discourse under scrutiny here.  Children, the 
elderly and the sick may arrive at innocence and the need for protection through 
representations and logics that are different from those of gender.  The remainder of this 
section is a reinterpretation of the discourse summarized above.  In this re-reading, particular 
attention is given to the differences in how children’s civilianhood and others’ are 
constructed, especially women as they make up the second most dominant civilian category in 
the discourse.   
 
In presenting the enormity of the plight Somali civilians faced, journalists liberally employed 
mortality statistics, death and starvation rates but applied these to only three groups: Somali 
civilians in general, children and the under fives.  No statistics were given for women as a 
separate category but there was no lack of figures for children.  We learned that measles was 
the primary killer of all under fives, for example, and that a quarter of all under fives had died 
by mid 1992.
77
  In addition to the accenting of age by the use of these categories, children’s 
physical state of weakness induced by war, starvation or disease was also continuously 
foregrounded.  It appeared from the discourse that children were inherently more physically 
vulnerable than women.  “Feeble Somalis, many of them children, are expiring as they stand 
in line for food.  Many end up in the makeshift graveyards that now adjoin food kitchens,” the 
Buffalo News bemoaned.
78
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Children’s physical vulnerabilities were different too.  Women were susceptible to rape by 
warring parties but child abuse, where it happened, was never mentioned.  Both women and 
children could be attacked for food although attacks on children received more attention.  The 
San Francisco Chronicle reported that several children were killed in Mogadishu for the grain 
they had.
79
   In contrast to children, women were more frequently portrayed as survivors.  
Consequently, their vulnerability had emotional connotations that children’s lacked; they 
were more often seen grieving for lost family members, for example.  Despite the greater 
emotional distress apparently incurred by women, the psychological impact of the war and 
famine was more strongly associated with children, and with teenage boys in particular, many 
of whom were portrayed as perpetrators of violence.  
 
Women’s vulnerability in the texts was more elaborated in the sense that it took on a greater 
variety of forms.  Yet it was children’s vulnerability to which journalists dedicated more 
column inches.  Moreover, women’s vulnerability was more tightly linked to circumstance 
than children’s: for example, women faced the problems of providing food, shelter and care 
for their families and had to endure the constraints of a patriarchal culture.  As a result, the 
prevailing social order appeared to be more at risk by women’s reduced ability to fulfill their 
traditional roles.  Children’s roles were also altered and the social order affected by the lack 
of education provision for them (although this was poor to begin with) and by the arming of 
hundreds of adolescents.  Yet the ramifications of this were to be felt directly by a small 
portion of the child population.  Furthermore, the meaning awarded this in the texts was 
expressed as anxiety about the future shape of Somali society.  So, while both women and 
children were constructed as the victims of circumstance (culture, war, famine, attack) and of 
biology (physical weakness, susceptibility to rape), overall children’s vulnerability was more 
rooted in biology and deferred from the ongoing crisis than women’s. 
 
In the western social imaginary, children are commonly understood to be in a process of 
development that adults have completed.  This development is a natural unfolding and can be 
thwarted by negative socializing forces such as exposure to violence.  As mentioned above, 
there was concern expressed in the texts that hundreds of older boys in Mogadishu were 
involved in conflict and perpetrated crime.  “[T]eenage males idled by peace still drive 
around in heavily armed ‘technicals,’” the Dallas Morning News complained.
80
  Warlords 
would feed khat to their “young gunslingers to keep nerves on alert even if bellies were 
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empty,” newspapers maintained.
81  The absence of reputable sources of socialization over 
children, such as education rather than warlords, generated further anxiety amongst 
commentators.  It appeared that the future social order depended on the full development of 
its young generation’s potential, including psychological development, and this was impeded 
by the crisis. 
 
Yet, there was the possibility of change if Somalis embraced it but the newspapers were 
pessimistic about the prospects.  For western onlookers, Somalis resistance to the healthcare 
humanitarian agencies provided showed woeful ignorance.  Likewise, there was an ignorance 
of the benefits to be gained from counseling for those traumatised by war, especially children, 
a situation one Save the Children worker thought “almost Dickensian.”
82   Somali resistance 
to the adoption of orphans by foreigners was a further example of backwardness that served 
to punish children and jeopardize their futures.
83
  Hence, many children were vulnerable to 
corrupting influences and could not avail of reform measures.  Yet, children were constructed 
as intrinsically good in the western social imaginary and this precluded most errant Somali 
children from bearing any blame.  Only rarely would they be held culpable for their 
misdemeanors by the press. 
 
The construction of civilians as innocent and vulnerable demanded that most occasions of 
deviance be silenced.  Thus, without any sense of contradiction, violent adolescent boys were 
regrouped with men while younger or non-combatant boys remained associated with women 
and other children.  “The [Somali] state is dead and its successors are children with AK rifles, 
holding women and children to ransom.”
84
  The reworked boundary was unremarkable 
because violence was still an activity wedded to masculinity and, consequently, those boys 
who perpetrated it achieved adultness as a result.  The shifts of the boundary operated to 
preserve the general validity of the civilian-combatant distinction and its gender and age-
related meanings. 
 
An important technique used in preserving the civilian-combatant boundary was the 
construction of a Somali hyper-masculinity. This served as a foil against which Somali 
women’s innocence and vulnerability appeared more amplified.  The aggression and 
militarism of Somali men was directed not only towards other Somali men in rival clans, but 
towards Somali women.  Somali masculinity was predatory and acted to deepen the 
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victimhood attached to Somali women and the divide between combatants and civilians.  The 
portrayal of Somali civilians as recipients of protection was an equally significant technique 
in boundary maintenance.  The texts paid attention to the protection offered by humanitarians 
– peacekeepers creating a safe environment for the delivery of aid and aid workers 
distributing it and medical care to civilians.  The dichotomy between the active rescuers and 
the vulnerable, passive rescued was illustrated repeatedly with this trope. 
 
The combatant-civilian boundary broke down subsequent to the Battle of Mogadishu in three 
ways.  Firstly, large numbers of civilians were constructed as a threat to peacekeepers rather 
than under their protection.  Secondly, women and children were described as party to the 
violence meted out to peacekeepers and the desecration of their bodies.  Thirdly, the 
celebrations of civilians at the defeat and death of peacekeepers tarred all civilians with the 
aggressiveness usually attributed only to men and older boys.  Effectively, their complicity 
with men and adolescent boys eradicated the usual stark contrast between civilians and 
combatants. The end result was a set of constructions in the media inconsistent with 
understandings of civilianhood.  The withdrawal of US peacekeepers and the protection they 
offered followed.   
 
In summary, the term civilian has a number of meanings in the social imaginary, the most 
important of which are innocence and vulnerability which bring with them the need for 
protection.  Gender and age are also crucially important meanings.  In the discourse on 
Somalia, the manner in which women and children were constructed as innocent and 
vulnerable varied.  Whereas women’s vulnerability was more circumstantial, children’s 
derived more from biology and a need for an uncorrupted physical and psychological 
development path.  Despite the violent acts committed by many children, their inherent 
goodness exonerated them from culpability and their innocence remained intact.  Where this 
stretched innocence excessively, they were awarded combatant status and adulthood by 
association with men.  Thus, of the two civilian categories garnering greatest coverage in the 
media, the construction of the child civilian was more profound, more robust and flexible.  It 
was anchored in supposedly immutable facts of nature.  It was perhaps for this reason that 
children achieved greatest visibility in the texts because they demonstrated civilian need more 
deeply and reliably than women.  Gender was insufficient by itself to maintain the difference 
of women civilians from male combatants, innocence had to be shown and not assumed as it 
could be for children.  Consequently, women’s civilian status was more contingent than 
children’s. 
 
Securitization and the Somali child civilian 
Several moves are discernable in the securitization of the crisis in Somali.  They are listed 
here without any intention of implying a sequence.  The first was the demonstration of urgent 
overwhelming need that could not be met by alternative means, by the work of charitable 
agencies or UN peacekeepers on the ground, for example.  Secondly, the intervention 
provided the US with an opportunity to gain soft power and demonstrate its position and 
hopes for a new world order.  Thus intervention was revealed, over time, to be in the best 
interests of the US.  Thirdly, the intervention was considered to be feasible as warfighting and 
materiel in Somalia were rudimentary and the risk manageable.  Fourthly, the risk to US 
peacekeepers was outweighed by the obvious humanitarian need of foreign civilians.  Fifthly, 
need translated into the need for protection rather than merely relief supplies or expertise for 
large parts of the population.  Sixthly, that population qualified as civilians in the American 
social imaginary because they were both vulnerable and innocent.  Lastly, vulnerability was 
undeniable because it was chiefly anchored in children’s nature.  It was also related to – 
although less powerfully – to the circumstances of women and the ramifications of their 
failure to uphold the social order.  Innocence stemmed largely from children’s natural 
goodness.  The logic running through these securitizing moves was reversed by the 
demonstration of unacceptable risk to US peacekeepers.  That this partly came from civilians 
themselves diminished the validity of constructions of innocence and showed Somali 
civilians’ complicity with their own plight. 
 
Conclusions 
This study utilized securitization theory in its attempts to position children more firmly within 
the realm of security studies.  It showed that the successful securitization of the intervention 
in Somalia relied on the construction of the Somali population as deserving of protection.  
Children played a fundamental role in this and acted as an important vector in the ascent of 
Somalia up the US political agenda.  
 
However, securitization theory has its weaknesses and has been subject to extensive critique.  
Rather than rehearse that critique here, suffice to point to certain strategies adopted in this 
paper to avoid pitfalls the literature has identified.  Perhaps the most notable is the charge that 
political elites’ actions are overemphasized in securitization theory to the detriment of 
others’85 and that too much weight is placed on a small number of speech acts at specific 
moments in time.86  Here, a wider range of actors was considered to play a role in 
securitization.  As the debate on Somalia is often taken as the prime example of the influence 
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of the media, it would have been unwise to exclude this set of actors nor their informants.  An 
attempt to paint in the backdrop to the Somali crisis was made and to broaden the number of 
speech acts that impacted securitization and the period over which they occurred.87  The 
intertextuality of the speech act was conveyed in this study by attending to the meaning of 
children in the western social imaginary and most obviously by the focus placed on the social 
meaning of civilianhood there.88  The author does not suggest that a discourse analysis 
sidestepped all problems: it omitted the role of an audience, for example, and had to assume 
that representational practices that were dominant across the US news media discourse 
reflected the US social imaginary in general.89  In this way, dominant representational 
practices operated as a kind of proxy for the audience, although this was not ideal. 
 
However, the chief problem securitization theory presented this analysis was its indifference 
to how the value of the referent object of security is created in favour of a discussion of 
threat.90  To have neglected value creation here would have been to overlook the value of 
children to the discourse entirely and therefore to have passed over the grammar of 
securitization in the Somali case.  Illustrating the existence of existential threat to a referent 
object was important but insufficient by itself.  Threat and vulnerability are two sides of the 
same coin and there was utility in unpacking each separately for the Somali case.  How 
children were vulnerable and how, by virtue of their innocence, they were deserving of 
protection were points of enormous significance in the public discourse that helped bring 
about securitization. 
 
The Somali case is an example of militarized humanitarian intervention and is not the usual 
material for securitization scholarship.  For countries with a history of peacekeeping, the 
procedures for involvement in interventions may be normalized and securitization theory may 
offer few insights as a result.  However, for especially dangerous or contentious interventions 
or those for which the responsibility to protect may be invoked, securitization theory may 
bring benefits.  As long as children’s profile in humanitarian emergencies remains high, there 
is purpose served in scrutinizing their involvement. 
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